recommendations on possible legal reform. 3 In that year, the Law Society of England and Wales (hereafter 'the Law Society') also published its Cohabitation report (2002) , in which it proposed a two-tiered system: a registration scheme for same-sex relationships which would provide registered partners with rights analogous to those for married couples; and a presumptive system which would confer lesser rights and responsibilities to opposite-sex and same-sex cohabitants on their satisfying certain criteria (e.g. a minimum period of cohabitation or the presence of children, and conjugality).
At present, it remains unclear whether, but appears highly probable that, the Law Commission is likely to recommend a presumptive system whereby rights and responsibilities will be ascribed to cohabitants. But it is not certain that the Commission will mirror the approach taken by the Law Society back in 2002 and recommend a presumptive model similar to the Law Society's. It is possible that the Law Commission may look to the models adopted by other Commonwealth countries such as Australia, where legislation has been introduced at sub-national level to deal with the financial and property matters of not only cohabitants but also those in caring relationships (although any recommendations by the Law Commission will not extend to the latter group). Given the possibilities, it remains highly speculative what direction the Law Commission is likely to take and what its recommendations are likely to be. This paper seeks to explore these various possibilities and more specifically to consider the effectiveness of these various models in addressing the economic vulnerability of cohabitants. Moreover, most reform proposals have been based on stretching the marriage model to 3 For a fuller discussion of the Law Commission's Sharing Homes discussion paper, see Wong (2003); Miles (2003) ; Mee (2004) .
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CRITERIA FOR INCLUSION AS A QUALIFYING RELATIONSHIP
The criteria used for defining a qualifying cohabitation in most presumptive models have tended to use the marriage model as the starting point. This is not unsurprising since the genesis of most of these models have invariably been the extension of some of the rights and privileges enjoyed by married couples to opposite-sex cohabitants. As the Australian experience demonstrates, most of the sub-national legislation was initially passed to provide opposite-sex cohabitants with access to a property redistribution regime at the breakdown of their Relationships Act 2003 (Tasmania)). For the purposes of this paper, I will focus only on the criteria used in defining qualifying relationships between cohabitants (which in the case of the Australian statutes are referred to as "de facto relationships").
What is evident in the Australian context is that the definition adopted by the statutes, when they were applicable only to opposite-sex cohabitation, was one based on the marriage model. 6 The adoption of a gender-neutral definition, which focuses on interdependency as the basis for recognising a relationship, no doubt has the potential for allowing a wider range of close personal relationships to piggy back on that definition to access the law. This approach also has the potential to destabilise the notion of heterosexuality and the hetero-nuclear family (Millbank & Sant 2000) . Millbank and Morgan (2001) , however, argue that legal reform which makes no reference to the parties' sexual relations is less radical because, in de-sexing cohabiting relationships, it renders the sexuality of the parties invisible. Same-sex relationships are therefore 'normalised' as domestic/interdependent/property relationships. 7 A major drawback for same-sex couples is that no recognition is given to the (sexual) celebration of their intimate relationships as the law renders lesbian and gay subjecthood and sexuality invisible (Millbank & Morgan 2001, p. 315).
Notwithstanding a purported move away from the marriage model in definitional terms, the Australian statutes evince a kind of 'retreat' to that model.
The courts may take into consideration a list of non-exhaustive factors in determining whether a de facto relationship exists (Property (Relationships) Act 1984, s.4(2); Relationships Act 2003, s.4(3)). 8 The factors specified include: the duration of the parties' relationship; the nature and extent of a common residence;
whether or not a sexual relationship exists; the care and support of children; and the reputation and public aspects of the relationship. As Millbank and Sant (2000) explain, this list is problematic because it has its origins and history in heterosexual de facto law which is based on a comparison with marriage. Some of the listed factors are therefore not relevant to same-sex relationships and might have a negative impact on establishing the existence of a de facto relationship. Further, as the presence of a sexual relationship is one of the relevant factors, conjugality is re-introduced by the back door in determining whether a particular relationship qualifies.
Relatedly, the question of inclusion also hinges on whether a cohabitation requirement is absolutely necessary. Here, we see differences in approach in the What we see is a stretching of the marriage model to accommodate the inclusion of other close personal relationships (Bottomley & Wong 2006) . This assumes that the marriage model itself is unproblematic and is indeed a satisfactory template. The basis for inclusion of other types of close personal relationships such as opposite-sex and same-sex cohabitation must thus be based on similarity or sameness. As has been argued elsewhere (Bottomley & Wong 2006) , the 'logic of semblance' has a serious limiting effect as it provides little space for more radical reform to be thought through in this area, and the potential for extending such reform to a wider group of relationships will involve the (un)necessary stretching of the marriage model even further.
BASIS FOR PROPERTY REDISTRIBUTION
The next issue which the Law Commission will need to grapple with is the basis upon which financial and property matters of cohabitants are to be resolved at the end of their relationships. Here, we see the possibility of adopting an approach based upon either property law or family law or, indeed, a combination of both. In its 2002 discussion paper, the Law Commission had considered a property law approach where rights over the shared home would be determined solely by contributions made, financial and non-financial. Such rights would arise as from the time the scheme takes hold (e.g. by making relevant contributions), and would take effect and be binding on third parties like any other beneficial interests in property.
Kent Academic Repository -http://kar.kent.ac.uk Published version available in 'Feminist Legal Studies 14 (2). pp. 145-145. ISSN 0966-3622' -11 -However, the Law Commission rejected making any proposals for such a statutory scheme on the grounds that the scheme would provide insufficient flexibility for taking into account the various contributions made within a diverse range of homesharing relationships. This conclusion is unsurprising given that, as acknowledged by the Law Commission itself, a key problem with that putative scheme was the lack of consideration being given to 'intention' as a prerequisite for acquiring a beneficial interest in the property. But more importantly, when dealing with issues of cohabitation, the choice between a property law and a family law approach is not always clear cut. This choice in part depends upon the objective of reform. If it is merely a question of property rights, clearly a property law approach is to be preferred. However, in most cohabitation cases, the issue of property rights is only one of many issues that require resolution at the end of the relationship, in which case a family law 11 The 'intention' requirement has, however, proved highly problematic in the family property context, especially in the area of trusts law. For a fuller discussion on the weaknesses of an intention-based approach to resolving property disputes, see Gardner (1993) ; Clarke (1998); Glover & Todd (1996) . (2)).
The Law Society similarly adopts an approach that is located within the family law tradition. Under its putative model, access to the law for cohabitants is status-based, with remedies to be awarded at the courts' discretion. The model allows financial and non-financial contributions (including contributions as a homemaker) to be taken into account in determining whether capital provision should be made at the termination of the relationship, which could be either a property adjustment order or a lump sum payment. But the Law Society draws a distinction between this approach and that for ancillary relief on divorce. Unlike divorce, the basis upon which capital provision is to be made to a cohabitant does At first glance, the alternative approaches to property redistribution taken in the Australian statutes, as well as in the Law Society model, appear to offer more to cohabitants than hitherto available under common law and equitable doctrines.
This is especially the case in relation to the law's treatment of non-financial contributions. As the threshold for making a property adjustment order under the Australian statutes is that it must be "just and equitable" to do so, the provision of 18 The limitations of using a restitutionary approach apply not only to statutory models but also to equitable doctrines. For a fuller discussion on the limitations of using equitable doctrines in the family property context, see Wong (1999) . 19 An application may be made by a cohabitant who has cohabited with the deceased in the same household for two years prior to the date when the deceased died: see s. stereotypical assumptions about the parties are allowed to apply, and to unpredictability about the outcomes in cases. A conservative valuation of these contributions will result in the court either drawing the conclusion that the claimant has suffered no detriment or reducing the share to be awarded to her.
FINANCIAL PROVISION ORDERS
In most of the cohabitation models, a sharp distinction is maintained between marriage and cohabitation. One of the key areas where such distinction is evident to make limited orders of maintenance but these are mainly for situations where the other partner's earning capacity is constrained by childcare responsibilities and/or she requires re-training in order to get back into the labour market. Thus, in determining whether to make a maintenance order, the courts may consider factors such as the financial resources, income and property of each party, the financial needs and obligations of each party, their responsibilities to support any other person and the physical and mental capacity of each party to take on gainful employment. These factors mirror some but not all the factors which the courts are entitled to take into consideration in marital proceedings. 20 They point mainly to maintenance orders being available only for limited periods (to enable re-training) 21 and where there are minor children living with one of the parties. place a maximum duration of three years after the maintenance order is made or four years from the time the relationship has ended, whichever is the shorter period. 22 In the case of a maintenance order for a child, the maximum duration of such an order should not exceed the period expiring when the child attains the age of 12, or where the child suffers from any mental or restrictions on the duration of financial orders will serve to address the economic vulnerability of the cohabitant in a more effective manner. If they do not, the better route would be to follow that taken by Tasmania, where discretion is left to the courts to determine for how long maintenance orders should run in order to enable a cohabitant to take steps to overcome her economic vulnerability and secure longterm financial independence.
OPTING-OUT PROVISIONS -SPACE FOR CONSIDERING NEW WAYS OF GOVERNING COHABITATION?
Another issue that the Law Commission will need to deal with in its project is whether recommendations should be made for a registration or a presumptive scheme. In its 2002 report, the Law Society favoured a presumptive system as the Society recognised that a registration scheme would provide greater certainty for cohabitants, in that they would have to expressly opt into the system in order to enjoy any rights and privileges, it felt that this benefit was outweighed by the drawbacks of registration (2002, paras. 31-35) . In particular, one of the key drawbacks was that those who are most unlikely to formalise their relationship would remain so even with a registration system and opposite-sex cohabitants may be disadvantaged by unscrupulous partners who might refuse to register. In addition, it would create a two-tier opposite-sex partnership system.
On the other hand, one of the main concerns of an ascription model is that parties covered by the statute will not have any choice as to whether or not they want their relationships regulated by the law. 23 To counter this, autonomy arguments favour giving cohabitants the choice to opt out of the statutory scheme.
This then raises the question of the extent to which cohabitants may be given autonomy to structure their own relationships and make arrangements regarding opposite-sex and same-sex cohabitants under the ascription models adopted in Canada.
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The Australian statutes all provide de facto partners with the choice to contract out by making their own arrangements, whether at the outset of the relationship or at its termination, in relation to financial and property matters. These agreements are, however, enforceable provided that they comply with the law of contract including the procedural safeguards provided in the statutes (Property (1)). Some of the safeguards are: the contract must be in writing and signed by both parties to the agreement; a solicitor's certificate is obtained prior to execution to confirm that independent legal advice has been provided to each party; and the solicitor's certificate is duly endorsed on the agreement. On satisfying these, the courts will give effect to the agreements made by not making orders which would be inconsistent with the terms of the agreement.
The agreement may also be revoked at the application to court of one of the de facto partners (Property (Relationships) Act 1984, s.50; Domestic Relationships Act 1994, s.35; Relationships Act 2003, s.64) . However, the statutes do provide a fallback for the exercise of the courts' discretion to make orders where, for example, the agreement does not satisfy any one or more of the procedural safeguards, or the circumstances of the parties have so changed since the making of the agreement that it would cause serious injustice if the agreement were to be enforced. In these situations, the courts may vary or set aside any one or more of the provisions in the agreement and/or treat the agreement as being of Registration of a deed would allow the parties to access the law immediately rather than waiting for the requisite two-year period of cohabitation before the presumptive scheme takes hold. This use of a contractual method of formalising the parties' relationship can be attractive as it provides the parties with the choice not only to opt out (through entering into either a personal relationship agreement or a separation agreement) but also expressly to opt in by drawing up a deed of relationship. It is hoped that the Law Commission would undertake a more robust review of the potential use of cohabitation contracts, and other contractual methods through which cohabitants may give effect to their choice of relationship, which might in turn lead to a re-thinking of the future use and role of pre-nuptial agreements in marriage. 
CONCLUSION
There are clearly a series of questions which the Law Commission will have to grapple with in this project of cohabitation. What this article has set out to do is to demonstrate how some of these questions may find answers in the various models of reform proposed in the U.K. by the Law Society as well as those adopted in the comparative examples of the Australian sub-national statutes. These questions can be summarised as follows:
• What definition should we use for defining a qualifying cohabiting relationship?
Should the marriage model remain the starting point? Would conjugality be required for inclusion? This requires thinking more clearly about whether conjugality is the nexus of cohabitation and economic vulnerability.
• What rights and responsibilities should be placed on cohabitants? To what extent should these mirror those of married couples and civil partners? The obvious approach of reform is to maintain a distinction between the range of rights and responsibilities of married couples and civil partners, and cohabitants. However, if the policy objective of reform is to address the issue of economic vulnerability, the U.K. government will have to address the question of whether the differential extension of rights in relation to matters such as property redistribution and financial provision, based on marital status, remains • Should property adjustment regimes be more closely aligned to a property law, contributions-based approach or a family law, contributions-and needs-based approach allowing discretion to the courts in awarding remedies? Should the Law Commission consider adopting an approach that is restitutionary in nature? In such cases, careful consideration needs to be given to the extent to which a restitutionary approach, which tends to be backward looking, will be able to address a cohabitant's economic vulnerability which may exist not only at the termination of the relationship but also extend beyond that for a period of time.
• To what extent should financial provision be made available to cohabitants?
Should there be time limits on the duration of these orders given that the overarching objective is to provide protection against economic vulnerability?
Should the factors for consideration be limited to only the financial resources of the choice of opting out of a presumptive scheme. The question is how provisions for opting out are to be structured and, more importantly, whether such private arrangements will be given full binding effect.
• Last but not least, the Law Commission will also need to address the issue of potential exploitation, particularly if opting out provisions were to be made 
